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Abstract 
The current study revisits the causal link between finite cognitive capacity and infant 
perseveration originally put forth by Berger (2004) wherein perseverative errors resulted from a 
limited amount of cognitive resources.  A dynamic systems perspective was used to test the 
interaction of a limited cognitive capacity and task difficulty by manipulating the contextual 
layout of Berger’s stair A-not-B paradigm (i.e. from 90-degrees to 180-degrees).  Two groups of 
infants, differing in walking experience but not in biological age, were presented the task of 
descending the A-side 5 consecutive times and to the B-side on the 6th trial.  Perseveration was 
not seen in either experience group; however, inexperienced walkers exhibited slower decision-
making and stair descent on B-trial than their experienced counterparts.  Results suggest that task 
difficulty alone is not enough to elicit perseveration but is a considerable factor when 
investigating the error. 
 Keywords: infants, cognitive capacity, dynamic systems, motor difficulty, perseveration 
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Revisiting the Causal Link between Finite Cognitive Capacity and Perseveration 
 Perseveration is the inability to inhibit a dominant response.  At one time or another, 
adults will have experienced this error.  One example for adults is comparing automobiles with 
automatic and manual transmissions.  If the driver’s primary vehicle has a manual transmission, 
they may find themselves reaching for the gearshift, or perhaps more often, stepping on an 
absent clutch.  Consider an adolescent who is learning to ride an “adult” bike which uses 
handbrakes instead of footbrakes.  Children who have spent their time learning and riding on 
bicycles with footbrakes may have a difficult time in the beginning making the transition of 
relearning the braking system using handbrakes.  The consequences of upgrading bicycles are 
usually painful consisting of bruises and cuts on the shins where the once proper braking action 
(e.g. stomping on the brakes) would jettison the pedals unperturbed backwards until they 
slammed against the shins of the new riders.  We are aware of situations such as these but 
continue our motor behavior.  This is a brief example of motor perseveration.   
 Most readers would be more inclined to store the above examples in a box labeled motor 
habit.  While this label is relevant for adult literature, it fails to explain similar behaviors in 
infants aged 6- to 12-months of age.  It is true that these instances become less common as we 
get older but they also become easier to explain through statements such as, “I was not thinking 
clearly,” or “I was not paying attention.”  The same cannot be said of infants.  There is a purity 
in infant perseveration that cannot be said for adults because how little of the world has been 
experienced by an infant compared to an adult.  We will discuss why infant perseveration is 
intriguing from Piaget’s original observations and some theoretical explanations as to why 
perseverative errors occur (Piaget, 1954).  Current theories will then be presented, along with 
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shortcomings, and additional possibilities and directions that research may take in order to 
resolve inconsistencies in any unitary causal theory. 
A-not-B Error 
Piaget (1954) first noted infant perseveration during one of his numerous experimental 
play sessions with his children.  In The Construction of Reality in the Child, Piaget described 
with great amazement his children’s (approximately 6-months of age) inability to find an object 
in a new location after successfully finding the same object in a previous location.  The process 
consisted of hiding his watch under a pillow within the reaching space of his infant.  The infant 
would see him hide the watch and retrieve it once Piaget cued his child to do so.  However, after 
several tries to the same location, Piaget then had his child notice him hide the timepiece within a 
short distance of the first location yet continuing to remain in the infant’s reaching space.  Once 
his child was cued to reach for the watch, instead reaching to the new location, his child reached 
back to the old location.  This became known as the A-not-B error, or infant preservation. 
The A-not-B task has been modified numerous times since Piaget’s inception (Wellman, 
Cross, & Bartsch, 1986).  It has been a cornerstone in examining this emerging error in 
cognition.  In its canonical form an infant (6- to 10-months of age) will retrieve the object from 
the first location (A) multiple times (e.g. usually 5 consecutive times).  A brief delay occurs 
between each trial.  After the child successfully reaches for the hidden object a predetermined set 
of times, the object is then hidden in a nearby location (B).  The child is then allowed to reach 
and is usually unable to stop his/herself from reaching back to the first location (A) regardless of 
seeing the object hidden at location B. 
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Reasonable explanations for infant perseveration have been given for several decades.  
Piaget (1954) opined the error was related to an incomplete object concept.  The 1970’s saw a 
steady rise in infant perseveration research that suggested the error resulted from proactive 
interference (Harris 1973, 1974).  Furthermore, Butterworth (1977a, 1977b) provided data that 
stressed dissonance between spatial cues and egocentricity.  These studies have one central 
element in common – working memory. 
Working memory is essential in such tasks as updating and maintaining object 
representations (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2000; Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002; Kagan, 1974).  
It is used to process stimuli as it relates to the self and the environment.  It is an instrumental 
component for success in the A-not-B task and is generally linked to the prefrontal cortex.  In 
conjunction to working memory, inhibiting a dominant action has also been localized to the 
prefrontal cortex (Diamond 1985, 1988). 
What could arguably be the first observed error in cognition, the prefrontal cortex is a 
reasonable place to begin when considering why perseveration occurs.  Infants begin goal-
oriented reaching at approximately 3-and-a-half months of age.  This is interesting because 
infants do not begin to motorically perseverate until about 6- to 7- months-of age (Clearfield, 
Diedrich, Smith, & Thelen, 2006).  There are months of active exploration that take place before 
we can observe the inability to stop a dominant action.  This leads to the question: Why is there a 
mismatch in development of cognition and action?  
Several investigations were dedicated to examining the role of the prefrontal cortex in the 
A-not-B task.  One way to explore the effects of a maturing prefrontal cortex is through brain 
lesions, or removing pieces of brain material that are associated with the area of interest.  Rhesus 
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monkeys of comparable maturation to 7-month-old-infants were used to test the importance of 
the prefrontal cortex on inhibition by removing those portions thought to be the most important.  
The rhesus monkeys without brain lesions performed better on the A-not-B task opposed to their 
lesioned counterparts; in other words, those rhesus monkeys with an untouched prefrontal cortex 
were able to successfully stop themselves from going back to A-side on the B-trial compared to 
their cohorts (Diamond, 1990).  Other portions of the brain have been shown to associate with 
both the prefrontal cortex and inhibition such as the anterior cingulate nucleus and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex all of which undergo a tremendous amount of synaptic growth and 
subsequent pruning during this stage of development (Bell & Fox, 1992 & Diamond, 1985, 
1988). 
At some level of emergent reaching, a match between action and cognition must take 
place.  Extending comparative studies to behavioral examinations, Diamond (1985) tested infants 
ranging from 7-and-a-half to 12-and-a-half months old using the A-not-B paradigm.  Her results 
suggested working memory, specifically the ability to keep a perceptual representation of the 
stimulus in memory, also expanded in capacity during this time.  This stemmed from the fact that 
the delay between hiding and finding the toy at each trial needed to be extended by a set amount 
of times as infants aged.  This suggests maturation of the prefrontal cortex is responsible for 
merging elements of working memory and motor action.  The question is where and at what 
time? 
One answer to this question can be found in work also done with rhesus monkeys by 
Goldman-Rakic (1987).  Her work showed an abundance of synaptogenesis taking place between 
motor cortex and the prefrontal cortex.  The observed synaptogenesis arguably began occurring 
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at around 6-and-a-half months of human age with the peak being at 8- to 8-and-a-half months of 
age.  She believed the emerging cohesiveness between motor and prefrontal areas is what 
provided success in tasks that require maintaining the perceptual representation in memory and 
acting such as the A-not-B error.   
The importance of brain maturation is imperative in the scheme of infant development.  
A growing trend seems to be a more compromising perspective in which maturation does take 
place but is not the sole factor in development such as earlier theorists like Gesell (1929) may 
argue.  Works from both Diamond and Goldman-Rakic provide both biological and behavioral 
accounts of prefrontal maturation and its success for the A-not-B error.   
In order to continue studying infant development, it is very important to observe and take 
into account many and all factors that occur over a single action.  While biological and 
behavioral approaches do a good job in cross-sectioning the field, a more recent theoretical 
perspective, Dynamic Systems, has been instrumental in re-thinking the importance of many 
simultaneous factors.  In the case of infant motor perseveration, this theoretical view has 
provided a sound foundation for investigating multiple levels of development.  Numerous levels 
of perception and action occur at any point in time.  Infants must learn to reach successfully 
which encompasses a near infinite amount of possible outcomes (Clearfield, Diedrich, Smith, & 
Thelen, 2006).  They must begin to understand their place in space (Where is the object from 
where I am at?), hand speed (Will my reaching speed have consequences on the object such as 
knocking it over etc.?), and overall motion (Do I need to reach around or am I able to reach 
directly to the object).  Odds are good that infants are not consciously making such 
considerations; however, these are just a few examples of what goes into a motor act.   
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 Learning to reach is a motor task that is perfected through hours and hours of trial-and-
error.  For instance, Thelen and colleagues (1993) followed 4 infants weekly for 30 weeks 
beginning from 3-months of age and then bi-weekly until 52 weeks of age in order to observe the 
emergence of reaching.  Two of the infants demonstrated similar pre-reaching patterns, or those 
arm and hand movements that exist when an object is present but before goal-oriented reaching 
emerges.  For example, their initial movements to the goal object were larger and faster in space 
surrounding the toy.  Their counterparts interestingly showed the opposite being less energetic in 
their pre-reaches.  Despite these differences, all 4 infants began merging into similar motor 
patterns when they started reaching and making contact with the toy successfully.  Experiencing 
and interacting with the environment led to a match, or organization, between cognition and 
action.   
 Self-organization is a good way of describing the development of synchronicity of 
cognition and action processes such as reaching.  Two children were abrupt and forceful in their 
unsuccessful movements while 2 children showed the exact opposite.   However, over the course 
of environmental feedback, the first 2 infants began to perform slow and steady movements 
while at the same time their counterparts were figuring out they needed to increase the speed and 
power of the own movements to successfully reach the target consistently.  This self-
organization can even be described as an embodied process in that learning is a combination of 
experiencing the senses and the environment through the body in conjunction with cognitive 
neurogenesis.  Both experience and maturation play extremely important roles in development.   
 Specific to the A-not-B task and infant perseveration, Smith and colleagues (1999) 
looked at the role of experience during this period of established brain maturation.  Several A-
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not-B experiments, varying in certain task contexts, were completed.  For instance, they 
manipulated how many times a child would reach to the first location (A) before hiding the 
object at B-side, postural and perspective change before the reach to B (reaches to A were made 
while the child was in a sitting position and then the reach to B was when the child was standing 
up), and also a visual only A-not-B task where the child makes no motor movement to either A- 
or B-sides.   
 Their findings reveal a great deal about the interaction of a maturing brain and experience 
with regards to perseveration.  First they showed motor cognition played an important part of a 
perseverative error.  An infant was more likely to incorrectly reach to the A-side on the B-trial 
(perseverate) as a function of the number of initial reaches to the A-side increases.  In other 
words, an infant would be more likely to perseverate when reaching to A-side 8 times opposed to 
reaching to the A-side 5 times. 
 Secondly, children err less when they are forced to stand before their reach to the B-side 
than if they remained sitting regardless of their consecutive reaches to the A-side.  This is a 
unique finding because it shows the error results not solely from working memory or motor 
cognition but a mixture of the two.  The egocentric position, or the child’s perspective and place 
in space, is another essential component to this error.  Both these elements demonstrate the 
importance of task context and a child’s experience.   
 The most important finding to take away from Smith and colleagues (1999) is the 
importance of context.  It is imperative to understand that when an infant is given a task, it is 
experienced in a set of certain circumstances.  Subtle changes in the perceived context can affect 
goal-oriented action (Topal, Gergely, Miklosi, Erdohegyi, Csibra, 2008).  Perturbing contexts 
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perturb perseveration.  Simple changes such as distracting where the infant looks or how the 
infant’s body is positioned before the reach to the B-side alters the result of the A-not-B task 
considerably.  The A-not-B task, as it is presented to the infant, cues a response based on his/her 
perception of the overall task.  Infant perseveration results from the fluid interaction between 
perception, motor, and relevant context at a point in time where the infant selects and performs 
an action.     
 However, this perspective has received criticisms.  It has been suggested that infants 
perseverate because of a limited cognitive capacity.  According to this view, infants have only a 
set amount of cognitive resources to apportion to the environment and the task as a whole.  This 
limits the amount of cognitive resources to engage the correct response (i.e. inhibit a dominant 
urge) when time to do so (Berger, 2004).   
 A cognitive capacity approach suggests that the more difficult a motor task is the more 
cognitive resources are needed to successfully carry out the task.  Cognitive resources are needed 
to process the environment (task context etc.) and perform a motor action.  Any goal-oriented 
action requires a degree of perception and decision-making with one requiring more cognitive 
resources than the other.  Specific to the A-not-B task, if there is a high degree of perceptual 
salience between the two locations (A-side is black, B-side is white), less cognitive resources are 
needed to maintain contextual information leaving more resources for selecting and executing 
the correct motor response.  Conversely, if both sides are camouflaged (no distinguishing color 
differences), then more resources are needed to maintain contextual information leaving less 
resources for selecting and executing a motor response.  Errors will then generally increase; in 
this case, perseveration is more likely to be observed.   
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 We can use walking as an example.  Walking is extremely challenging for infants who 
have just learned the skill.  New walkers carefully maintain their balance by raising their arms 
from their sides and visually focusing on where they want to go.  However, walking across the 
room can be difficult if there are numerous items either in the way or catching their attention.  
Successfully completing a goal-oriented action requires balancing between perceptual and motor 
elements. 
 To test the cognitive capacity hypothesis, Berger (2004) expanded the canonical A-not-B 
paradigm from a reaching task to a locomotor task with 2 conditions.  The 2 conditions were a 
walking condition and a stair-descending condition.  Thirteen-month-old infants were used.  
Each task was made up of 2 walkways creating a 90° angle with a marked central location 
serving as the apex.  The infant was placed on the apex (the starting location).  The infant’s 
caregiver was the object to be retrieved, in other words, the infant had to walk or descend to the 
caregiver.  The caregiver was told to stand in plain sight in front of the infant at the end of the 
walkway, the A-side.  Infants were released, and as expected, they took the correct, direct route 
to the caregiver.  On the 6th trial, infants were held on the starting location while their caregiver 
walked to the end of the other walkway (the B-side).  The infant was then released to see 
whether a direct path was selected or if he/she went to the more salient A-side and then over to 
the caregiver.  The stair-descending condition was completed in the same way with each path 
consisting of 4 small risers.  
 Walking and descending stairs, the locomotor conditions, were used to vary the levels of 
motor difficulty.  Berger assumed infants would use less cognitive resources to walk to a location 
opposed to descending the stairs to a location.  Using fewer resources in the walking condition 
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would allow the infant more cognitive resources to inhibit the dominant action to the A-side and 
simply go directly to the B-side.  Conversely, descending stairs would require using more 
resources, especially in young walkers, resulting in a reduced amount of cognitive resources left 
to inhibit the dominant response of going to the A-side before going to the caregiver at the B-
side. 
 Results from Berger (2004) showed infants perseverated more in the stair-descending 
task than the walking task.  More specifically, 5 of the 20 (25%) infants demonstrated locomotor 
perseveration in the more difficult stair task while 0 of the 20 (0%) infants perseverated in the 
easier walking task.  This finding suggests that working memory as associated with cognitive 
capacity can lead to perseveration.  However, we ask the question whether perseverative findings 
are solely related to task difficulty and finite cognitive capacity as proposed by Berger (2004)?  
To do this, we limited motor difficulty to only the stair-descending condition because walking 
was not demanding enough to elicit perseveration in Berger (2004).  In order to isolate context, 
the goal locations in the locomotor A-not-B task were extended from 90° to 180°.  Perseveration 
dampens when goal destinations are further apart (Wellman, Cross, & Bartsch, 1986).  Altering 
the angle from 90° to 180° is the largest angle manipulation possible; therefore, if the cognitive 
capacity hypothesis is true for motor difficulty then perseveration similarly found in Berger 
(2004) should be present in this study.   
 The current study examines several modifications that test the cognitive capacity 
hypothesis.  The first modification was to change the angle of the stairs used in Berger (2004) 
from 90° to 180°.  This manipulation changes task context but holds task difficulty constant.  
The locomotor difficulty, descending the stairs, stays the same but only the context changes 
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(direction of the stairs).  If task difficulty alone depletes cognitive resources, then we should find 
similar perseverative findings compared to Berger’s (2004) 90° condition; however, if different 
results are found, then contextual elements must continue to be taken into account when 
attempting to explain infant perseveration.   
 Secondly, we considered the walking experience of participants.  Infants with more 
walking experience should find stairs easier than those with little walking experience.  Instead of 
recruiting a biological age range which can have participants vary in walking experience, we 
chose to recruit infants based on walking experience.  If the cognitive capacity hypothesis holds 
true, then walking infants in either experience group should perseverate because similar task 
difficulty already found perseveration.  Furthermore, infants in the inexperienced group should 
perseverate the most because they will use more cognitive resources to navigate the difficult 
situation as opposed to their experienced counterparts which would leave fewer resources to stop 
themselves from making the motor error.   
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 50 infants participated with 32 able to complete protocol with data being kept 
for analysis.  Of the 18 infants not kept for analysis, 9 were unable to complete protocol (e.g. 
boredom, fussiness, etc.) and 9 were unable to descend stairs (e.g. fear of heights, refusing to 
practice stairs).  Groups were divided based on parental report of walking experience.  In order to 
isolate experience, the groups needed to be similar in biological age.  A Wilcoxon test 
determined there was no difference in biological age between the inexperienced walking group 
(MAge=382.81 days-old, SD=26.248) and the experienced walking group (MAge=406.69 days-old, 
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SD=60.926); however, there was a difference in parental report of walking experience 
respectively (MWalkExperience=28.31 days, SD=5.425; MWalkExperience=74.31 days, SD=17.423, t(30) 
= -10.083, p < .0001) (See Figure 1).  Stair experience was a little more difficult to determine.  
Parents were unable to report a timeframe of stair experience (e.g. 2 weeks, 1 month, etc.).  
Some infants would spend multiple times a day on stairs.  Other infants might spend twice the 
amount of time but do so all in one day every week to two weeks.  Therefore, participants were 
divided by those who ascended and descended stairs more than once a day and less than once a 
day.  These numbers were then grouped by levels of experience.  A Chi-Square was used to 
analyze the groups.  Results indicated that experience groups did not differ between ascending 
and descending stairs (See Figure 2).  Gender was equally balanced. 
 Names of participants were selected from a government database where parents 
previously provided permission to participate in experimental studies on the University of 
Tennessee-Knoxville campus.  Mailings and phone calls were made to those parents with age 
appropriate infants.  Contact was made when infants were between 44 and 48 weeks of age.  The 
purpose of the study was explained to the parents and those who were interested were scheduled 
for appointments based on their infant’s walking experience.  All infants were from 
uncomplicated, normal term births with no known neurological or physical disorders.  
Participating infants and parents received $5.00 along with a photo and certificate of 
participation.   
Apparatus 
 The locomotor A-not-B task consisted of a pedestal and two staircases.  The 
specifications were similar to those described in Berger (2004).  The area of the starting platform 
13 
 
will be 20 inches X 20 inches and will have a height of 23 inches above the floor.  Four 24 inch 
poles will be set at each of the corners of the pedestal to assure balance.  Each set of stairs will be 
identical in build and will lead 180° from the pedestal (i.e. the pedestal will be in the center and 
each staircase will lead to opposite ends).  Both staircases will have 4 steps and will be 20 inches 
wide so it matches directly to the width of the starting platform.  Each staircase will extend 3 feet 
from the starting pedestal with each step height being 9 inches.  Handrails will be attached to 
prevent falling and to aid balance.  All steps were covered in a firm carpet as not to impede 
balance.  In addition, all corners of the apparatus were smoothed and rounded with sandpaper to 
prevent injury (See Figure 3).   
 Sessions were recorded using 2 Sony Hi8 video cameras.  The video was streamed 
through a Digital Video Switcher (Datavideo Corp., Whittier, CA) to allow split-screen viewing.  
A Horita TRG-50 (Horita, Mission Viejo, CA) video timer ran simultaneously so that video 
segments could be extracted for analysis.  The entire video feed will be recorded on a VHS tape 
using a Panasonic AG-1980 VCR. 
Design and Procedure 
 The locomotor A-not-B task described in Berger (2004) was followed in an attempt to 
attribute perseveration to either context and/or motor difficulty.  Parents were placed at a point 3 
feet directly to one side of the starting pedestal (i.e. at the edge of the staircase).  Each starting 
side was counterbalanced.  The experimenter placed the infant on the pedestal with the body 
facing straight ahead toward a neutral location.  The infant was free to choose either side; 
however, the parent was informed to continually call for and offer a toy to their child.  Parents 
were told in advance not to help the child down the stairs or to reach out with the toy to prevent 
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the infant from losing concentration and/or falling.  Once the infant made contact with the floor, 
a brief play session no greater than 10-seconds, occurred to prevent anxiety or boredom, and then 
the child was placed the same way on the pedestal.  This happened 5 consecutive times.  In the 
event 5 consecutive times to the A-side does not happen, the session is discontinued.   
  After 5 consecutive trials, the infant was placed back on the pedestal.  The parent was 
then cued to leave the A-side and walk in front of the pedestal to the B-side (i.e. the bottom of 
the other set of stairs).  The infant was then released and the parent was then cued to do the same 
behavior as during the 5 trials to the A-side (See Figure 4).  
 It should be noted that new walkers were touched periodically, and in some cases held for 
safety.  At times, infants were fearful of the steps but were willing to descend.  Some trial 
descents required brief experimenter touches for safety.  Other times, more aggressive measures 
were needed for safety.  These situations, in particular, called for grabbing the back of the shirt, 
arm, or body to assure participants did not fall down the stairs or hit their head against the rail.  
Occasionally participants were caught in an unsafe position and were placed on the step they last 
touch so they could resume from a safe position.  Infants were not cued; however, because 
touching was deemed necessary for safety and possibly confounding the results, the frequency of 
touching was coded, and then categorized as needed or unneeded for safety, in order to test 
whether the act of touching moderated our findings.   
Before departure, all parents were debriefed with regards to the purposes of the study.  
They were given a questionnaire to complete that consisted of start dates for crawling and 
walking, amount of weekly experience on stairs in both crawling and walking phases, and how 
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often and what methods the parents (if they had stairs in the home) used to teach the infants to 
descend stairs.   
Video Coding and Analysis 
Recorded sessions were imported into Noldus Observer XT.  Videos were then coded 
using variables defined in the relevant sections of analysis.  A standard PC Keyboard was used to 
code the start/stop of behaviors (e.g. the time it takes to start going down the stairs until they 
reach the bottom) and the individual coding of specific instances of a singular behavior(e.g. how 
many times a walker scoots down the stairs).  The duration of events and the sum of individual 
events were calculated using the Noldus Observer XT and then exported to SPSS for data 
analysis. 
Two independent coders analyzed the video recordings using the Noldus Observer XT.  
Coders analyzed latency, duration of descent, perseveration, and descent efficiency.  Results of 
the variable coding were compared against one another for reliability.  Interrater reliability for 
these variables was 91%. 
Results 
First Order Perseverative Findings 
 A switch in context (180° from 90°) dampened perseverative findings.  Three of sixteen 
inexperienced walkers perseverated.  One of these three started the wrong direction and then 
corrected to go to location B.  For the experienced group, only one child perseverated.  Four 
walkers of a total of 32 perseverated or 12.5%.  Berger (2004) had a 25% rate of perseveration (5 
of 20 walkers).  Statistically, infants did not perseverate either as a whole or based on 
experienced level X2(1, N=32) = 1.14, p = .285 (See Figure 5).  Motor difficulty alone does not 
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fully answer the cause of perseveration nor does the absence of significant perseveration 
discredit the cognitive capacity hypothesis.  The results of perseveration are usually presented as 
a dichotomous variable.  Infants either do or do not perseverate.  Data was analyzed at different 
levels (e.g. survey and observational) in order to prevent a narrow focus on perseverative results 
and to shed light on what contexts lead to the error.   
Locomotor Experience 
 The groups were divided based on walking experience in order to increase the difficulty 
of the task.  Differences in walking experience did not increase perseveration as we predicted so 
other locomotor factors were considered in order to rule out possible alternatives to walking 
experience.  The surveys presented to the parents provided data that included crawling 
experience, overall locomotor experience, and frequency of stair play.   
 Groups did differ on crawling experience, t(30) = 2.77, p = .010.  Parents of 
inexperienced walkers reported more crawling experience (M = 137.12 days, SD = 29.56) than 
those parents of experienced walkers (M = 104.94 days, SD = 35.92).  If crawling experience 
were to be a factor, then it is reasonable to consider whether there is a difference in total 
locomotor experience.  Analysis indicated that there was no difference in parental reports of total 
locomotor experience between inexperience infants (M = 82.72 days, SD = 15.16) and 
experienced infants (M = 89.62 days, SD = 21.39).  Total locomotor experience should be a 
better indicator of success in a locomotor task compared to crawling.  This is not the case here.  
Since total locomotor experience did not differ, the crawling difference does not seem to provide 
any additional aid in moving and experiencing the environment.   
17 
 
 Infants additionally did not differ on stair play.  Parents were asked how many times a 
day the let their child go up and down a set of stairs.  We considered any set of 4 consecutive 
steps a set of stairs.  All parents reported having daily access to stairs so theoretically the 
question can be limited to how often the parents allowed their child access up or down the stairs.  
For both ascending and descending, we dichotomously tallied the average attempts per day (e.g. 
+/- once a day).  Parents were more inclined to let their children ascend than descend stairs.  
Most parents attributed going down the stairs less to safety concerns.  Regardless, neither 
experience group showed a difference in ascending or descending stairs daily, X2(1, N=32) = 
0.183, p = .669.  Therefore, any findings related to the task are related to the divergence of 
walking experience.     
Second Order Perseverative Findings 
 Our first order of perseveration was limited to whether infants did or did not inhibit the 
prepotent act.  Yet there is more to perseveration than the dichotomous labeling.  Here, we 
discuss the 2 categories in perseveration.  These peripheral, or second order findings, include 
infants’ speed of decision-making and how long it takes the infant to descend stairs.   
Latency 
 Latency was defined as the time it took the infant to make a motor decision to A-side or 
B-side after being released on the pedestal.  It was reviewed 2 different ways.  First, we looked at 
the total average of decision speed on all 5 A-trials compared to the B-trial.  Infants did not differ 
on how quickly they made a decision on the 5 A-trials (MA_Lat_Experienced = 1.0652 s, 
MA_Lat_Inexperienced = 0.8925 s) but there was an interesting difference when the inexperienced 
infants switched to the B-side (MB_Lat_Experienced = 1.0652 s, MB_Lat_Inexperienced = 0.8925 s).  A 
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Mann-Whitney performed indicated inexperienced infants were significantly slower to make the 
decision to go to the B-side than the experienced group, z = -3.036, p = .002. 
 We then considered latency trends, or whether the infants of either group became quicker 
as trials progressed.  A Friedman test was performed to assess whether the infants became faster 
from the first A-trial to the last A-trial.  Results indicated that both the inexperienced group, z = -
3.054, p = .002, and experienced group, z = -3.303, p = .001, significantly decreased their times 
from the 1st to the 5th trial.  A trend emerges that suggests infants of both groups were creating 
stable motor patterns for one particular side over another, in this case, the A-side over the B-side.  
The important question is whether this trend continues from the last A-trial to the first B-trial, or 
when the side changes to test for perseveration (See Figure 7).   
 A Wilcoxon statistic was performed to compare the A-5 trial versus the B-1 trial for both 
the inexperienced and the experienced groups.  Only the inexperienced walkers showed a 
significant delay in decision-making on the B-trial (z = -2.741, p = .006).  Experienced walkers 
stayed on par with the previous decision-making times on the A-trials.  This divergence provides 
a little insight into the differences between experience groups.  The results suggest that the 
experienced walkers were able to overcome the prepotent response to the A-side without 
dedicating more time to consider the option.  Conversely, inexperienced infants needed extra 
time to make the correct decision to B on the B-trial suggesting an increased need to cognitively 
reject the prepotent response to A on the B-trial and then execute the correct motor decision to B.   
Duration of Descent 
 Another relevant component measure is how quickly groups go down the stairs.  We 
defined descent duration as the moment the foot left the platform to descend to the last foot on 
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the ground.  Of the average 5 A-trials, inexperienced walkers (M = 30.57 seconds, SD = 16.94) 
did not differ in descent duration from experienced walkers (M = 23.81 seconds, SD = 11.21, 
See Figure 8).   
 We then chose to look more closely at the trends between the A-trials and the experience 
groups.  Inexperienced walkers significantly improved their speed of descent from the first A-
trial to the last A-trial, Wilcoxon z = -4.773, p = <.0001.  Experienced walkers also showed 
improvement in descent speed but the trend was not significant (See Figure 9).   
 As we would expect, experienced walkers were faster at going down the stairs and 
showed less of a learning trend over the 5 A-trials than inexperienced walkers.  We can infer that 
inexperienced walkers retained more of their previous actions in order to increase their speed on 
the next trial.  Regardless of the trend, infants of either experience group showed no difference in 
descent from A-5 to B-trial.  This result reflects a difference in motor ability between the 
experience levels but does not show a cognitive impact on the motor system.  Once the infant 
made the decision to B-side, no evidence indicates that the infant reconsidered their decision as it 
relates to descent speed.  If the infant was suffering from a cognition-action trade-off, then we 
would expect to see a difference in that infants would be slower to descend on the B-trial.   
 These analyses are telling in the cognitive component of the A-not-B task.  To isolate 
this, we considered that perhaps the experienced children were bored with the task or that the 
stairs did not provide them enough challenge to stay engaged for the full descent.  To test this, 
we created a measure called action phase.  We considered the action phase to be the start and 
stop of descending 1 step.  For the whole trial, for example A-1, we would have the start and stop 
of each step and then the sum, in seconds, would be the action phase of descent.  This allowed us 
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to parse out any non-task related behaviors such as looking around the room or playing on a stair.  
This action phase data and subsequent analysis revealed the same pattern as expressed in the 
whole duration analysis.  Infants, with inexperienced more so than experienced, showed a 
learning trend in going down stairs.  More importantly, once the decision was made on the 
pedestal, cognitive resources committed navigating the stair task and not second-guessing their 
decision.   
Descent Strategies 
 Our last measure of interest related to the strategies the infants adopted to descend the 
stairs.  Were experienced walkers more efficient (e.g. any non-stepping behavior) than 
inexperienced walkers?  Do inexperienced walkers demonstrate more inefficient (e.g. any 
stepping or side-stepping) than experienced walkers?  Descent strategies are important in this 
case because it allows us to observe the motor flexibility of the groups in each infant across trials 
and also among experience groups.   
 Strategies were divided into efficient and inefficient categories.  Efficient strategies 
consisted of any less challenging descent behavior that would otherwise consume more cognitive 
resources.  For example, crawling, backing down, and scooting are all strategies that are 
manageable with less dedicated cognitive resources.  Because these methods use less cognitive 
resources, walkers who rely on these methods arguably have more cognitive resources to inhibit 
a dominant response.  Conversely, stepping and side-stepping, which consisted of foot probing, 
indicated infants were spending a greater time figuring out how to go down the stairs.  These 
acts, which we called inefficient descent strategies, arguably use more cognitive resources 
leaving few to inhibit the perseverative act.   
21 
 
 Overall, both experience groups used efficient strategies less (MPercent = 34.85) than 
inefficient strategies (MPercent = 65.15).  Using more inefficient methods to descend the stairs 
should have used additional cognitive resources thus showing a greater amount of perseveration.  
In addition, with no difference in strategy use by inexperienced walkers, it is surprising that the 
task was not difficult enough to increase the perseverative response.  Analysis indicated no 
difference between strategy use and experience level.  This in mind, perhaps motor flexibility 
made the task less difficult or less fixed on a certain strategy increasing the odds that a prepotent 
response is broken. 
Experimenter Contact and Moderator  
 An additional viewing and coding of the video centered on experimenter contact was 
completed.  A question is whether experimenter contact cued and/or aided infants in this task.  In 
other words, did experimenter contact affect most, if not all, the measured variables?  To answer 
this question, I operationalized contact between the experimenter and child for each step as being 
touch, grab of shirt or body, or catching and placing on step last touched.  Some walkers are 
braver or more adventurous than others.  I took this into account and coded a subcategory of 
contacts as whether needed for safety or not.  I determined they were needed if the walker 
demonstrated an unsafe behavior during the current or the step before (e.g. wobbling, no handrail 
usage, falling).  These numbers were then calculated as a raw score and a normalized score and 
were separated by experience level, See Tables 1 and 2. 
 The results were surprisingly identical.  Each experience level had 119 touches and of 
those 119 touches, 114 (or 95.80%) were necessary over 32 participating infants.  Some infants 
required more touches than others as I alluded to earlier.  However, only 2 of the 32 walkers 
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required no contact at anytime.  Of these 2, 1 perseverated and the other did not (See Table 2).  
One exceptionally brave infant rarely used handrails and demonstrated very little reservation of 
heights.  He would raise his hands and start going down the stairs excitedly needing a hand on 
the collar for all trials.  Sessions like these sometimes lasted a total of 5 to 7 minutes, very quick 
considering some required upwards of 20-30 minutes.   
 While neither experience group appeared to receive more contact than another, it is 
conceded experimenter contact still may have had an effect.  Regardless of the need for 
experimenter contact, one can argue that contact may have lessened motor difficulty thereby 
affecting perseveration.  Latency was independent of this possible confound as it was 
experimenter contact free.  Infants were never in danger of falling off the pedestal before 
committing to their first step.  In other words, infants required no contact after placement on the 
pedestal and their first move towards a side.  Latency is central to this project as we did find a 
significant difference in experience level.  Inexperience infants did take longer to decide on 
Trial-B but were not contacted more or even at all on the pedestal (i.e. during the time they took 
to make first move/decide). 
Discussion 
 Most results failed to directly support the cognitive capacity hypothesis as all but latency 
showed no effects.  Perseveration, our main interest, was not present here (4 of 32 walkers 
compared to Berger, 2004, 5 of 20 walkers).  However, latency, or time to commit to a decision, 
demonstrated that a cognitive load was present suggesting that the cognitive capacity hypothesis 
requires additional investigating.  This finding suggests both context and motor difficulty have 
an effect on motor performance.   
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For this to be said, age and experience had to be controlled.   If the ages between the two 
groups were significantly different, then one can argue that neurobiological differences were also 
present.  Age was controlled here so that the results could be directly related to levels of motor 
experience.  Motor experience was not controlled for previously so it was difficult to consider 
whether the perseveration found in Berger (2004) was related to task difficulty or experimenter 
cuing.  I considered a more inexperienced infant would find the task more difficult than an 
experienced walker.  That appeared to be the case here with inexperienced infants being slower 
in the motor phase and also a significant delay in considering the correct path (latency) when 
time to choose.  
 One question that remains is the role of stair experience.  How would stair experience 
play part in this study?  This study was not able to provide a look into this type of specific motor 
experience.  However, it is a strong question to raise when considering similar studies for the 
future.  I believe with more stair experience walkers would descend stairs faster and be more 
fixed in their descent strategies (not switching continuously).  A quicker descent than walkers 
with low stair experience argues a more practiced motor program (stairs); thus, more resources 
left over to not perseverate.   
Berger (2004) was an interesting attempt to re-explain the A-not-B error but there were 
several factors that seemed to need more control or more investigation.  Age and experience was 
one.  The second was task complexity.  Changing the paradigm from 90° to 180° made the 
experiment equally challenging from a motor perspective but changed the context of the task 
significantly than Berger (2004).  Changing the contexts tend to decrease perseveration.    I 
thought such a drastic change to context would eliminate perseveration at any level (motor, 
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cognitive).  Locomotor perseveration was not found; however, cognitive representations of the 
error were present.  Findings here continue to show that context and motor challenges interfere 
with each other.   
 The change in contexts was so great I predicted that infants should perceive the paradigm 
as 2 separate parts from sides A to B.  A 90° angle maintains more in the visual field than a 180° 
angle.  More elements in the visual field to process and consider increases the difficulty of any 
task due to distractions and/or a trade-off in cognitive resources.  Walkers would have more 
environmental information to process and consider before and during their decision to move to a 
particular side.  At 180°, less environmental information is present because the parent is on the 
opposite side of where they were previously.  This should help the infant considerably because 
there are no other factors from that visual field to consider but just a motor memory to overcome.   
 Results indicate that motor memory played part to this story.  Walkers of both experience 
groups got faster as the trials progressed.  Increasing speed in a motor task is representative to a 
motor preference.  From a dynamic systems view, a stable motor pattern emerges as a motor 
action repeats itself.  As the pattern increases in stability, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
break that pattern.  This situation the pattern was still present to some extent.  First, infants still 
demonstrated a faster pace on the B trial indicating that the overall motor representation of 
descending stairs was still present.  Secondly, walkers initially considered their initial decision 
less also indicating a more stable motor representation, or habit.   
 The change in contexts diminished this to an extent compared to Berger (2004) but not 
the amount I thought it would.  Latency was a good variable to indicate a possible explanation.  
Infants increased their speed to decide which side to go to but it was surprising that both levels of 
25 
 
experience decreased on the choice to B.  While inexperienced infants were significant, the 
findings that experienced infants still showed a decrease in decision-making time, really forces 
one to consider that both motor and context do come together in some exchange of a cognitive 
capacity.   
 A clean division in age and experience level supports this imbalance of resources 
between motor and cognitive resources.  As an infant is better in a motor action, it requires less 
thinking to carry it out.  The results here indicate this.  Motor difficulty stayed the same and it 
was apparent from the descent times that inexperienced children were somewhat delayed than 
their counterparts as seen in the trend in faster times.  The decision-making aspect, or cognitive 
level, may be impacted by brain development as discussed in the introduction.  Age being 
controlled provides a strong indication that resources were being competed for between the 
motor and cognitive aspects of a task.   
 This study however is not without its shortcomings.  First, parental report of experience 
may not have been the best option for classifying infants’ motor level.  Parents may exaggerate 
their child’s skills for a variety of reasons.  An alternative would be to create an independent 
measure of the child’s motor skill either during an extended play session in the laboratory or over 
a course of several home visits.  This is time consuming and not efficient for a graduate level 
project.  Trips either to the parents’ homes or to the laboratories would be costly for the 
experimenter, laboratory resources, and time and the benefits from a survey may not be 
worthwhile.  
 The second consideration also deals with experience, more specifically, stair experience.  
Parents were unable to provide a timeframe in which their children were exposed to stairs as they 
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were able to give about walking.  For example, parents were not in a position to advise how 
much time their child played on stairs but were in a position to tell how many times a day their 
child may go up or down a set of stairs.  This “per day” report provided me the opportunity to 
compare participants who went up and down stairs less than once a day versus those who went 
up and down stairs more than once per day.  There was no difference in experience groups who 
went up and down stairs less than once a day to those who did the same more than once per day.  
For this study, the lack of control as it relates to stair experience makes it difficult to truly argue 
that participants really differed on the motor task.  Infants in either experience group may have 
similar levels of experience in “total time” but were simply miscategorized using what was 
available, “per day.”  This uncontrolled level of experience may have attributed to the null 
findings because descending stairs may have been just as easy for several inexperienced walkers 
as they were for experienced walkers.   
Another consideration is infant temperament and assistance.  All infants are different.  It 
is very obvious that some infants did not care about their own safety while others were overly 
cautious and even used their feet and hands to probe the next step for safety.  It is difficult to be 
consistent in providing a safe environment for all stair exercises.  In addition to a motor survey, 
if someone were to do a similar study in the future may want to consider some temperament or 
safety awareness.  The differences in some of the children were apparent in that fear of the 
exercise was apparent while some infants relished the near-falling down the stairs.  This is 
worthwhile to consider for future evaluations and segues to experimenter contact.  
 Experimenter contact did occur.  Being adventurous was highly variable in this sample.   
Depending on the infant and at that moment on the steps, participants were touched and at some 
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points grabbed by the back of the shirt, or arm, or trunk of the body to prevent falling down the 
apparatus or hitting their head against the rails.  A uniform procedure on experimenter contact 
was near impossible due to many factors.  Infants clothing at times was not enough to stop a 
forceful fall and a stronger grab was necessary.  Descent strategies were also varied making it 
difficult to choose one particular way for safety.  Experimenter contact was necessary but may 
still have affected motor difficulty and results.   
 Task difficulty, therein perseveration, may have been impacted by experimenter contact.  
Motor difficulty could have been lessened by the need to assure infant safety.  Infants who were 
more adventurous than their counterparts may have discovered that their welfare was not an issue 
because of the experimenter being there for safety.  Those infants who were overly cautious 
never needed the cautionary touch or grab therefore never knowing there was an alternative to 
being overly cautious.  The difference is that the group of conscious infants never came to learn 
or use to their advantage the experimenter touch or grab.  Due to the aforementioned, I cannot 
conclude what part context played, if any, in this experiment.   
 Regardless, I find these results relevant and worthwhile to A-not-B literature.  The time 
taken to decide on B-trial while on the pedestal indicates that a challenge for cognitive resources 
exist between motor and cognition.  A give-and-take relationship is valid and should be 
considered for future perseveration studies.  Here, new walkers were faced with a challenge that 
needed more consideration to successfully navigate and complete.  If experience groups found 
the task equal in difficulty, then no difference in latency should be seen between the groups.  
Since inexperienced walkers were faced with the same decision as their experienced 
counterparts, we can assume that the new walkers were faced with a cognitive-action trade-off.   
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The cognitive capacity approach is a strong recommendation for the A-not-B debate and is a 
strong element that can be tested with the dynamic systems approach.  
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Age and Experience in Days X Level of Experience
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Figure 1.  Means of how old the child was in days and also how many days the children had been walking 
until day of participation.  Both were based on parental report.  No age differences were found in the age 
of the child; however, the two groups differed on experience level.  Standard deviations are represented in 
the figure by the error bar attached to each column.   
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Ascending/Descending Stairs X Experience Level 
Ascending X > 1/time a day X < 1/time a day 
Experienced 6 10 
Inexperienced 8 8 
 
Figure 2.  Parents reported how many times a day their infant spends on stairs each day.  Data 
was reported by ascending or descending stairs.  Infants in both experience groups were divided 
by either going up/down more or less than once a day.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descending X > 1/time a day X < 1/time a day 
Experienced 3 13 
Inexperienced 4 12 
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Picture of Stair Apparatus 
A)     B)         
                                             C)            
 
Figure 3.  Three different pictorial perspective of the apparatus.  A) Wide-angle view and the 
perspective data was visually recorded.  B) Parents view as this is the location the caregiver 
would stand and call for their child.  C) Child view from the top of the pedestal towards their 
parent.   
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Figure of 180° versus 90° Paradigms 
 
 
Figure 4.  The left side shows the 90° paradigm used in Berger (2004).  The right side 
indicates the 180° paradigm used in the current study.  For each representation, the larger square 
is the central starting location and each box of lines represent stairs extending from the central 
point.  Each side is considered A or B and these sides were counterbalanced over the course of 
the study.   
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Number of Participants Perseverated by Level of Walking Experience
Level of Walking Experience
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Figure 5.  Number of times infants per experience group motorically perseverated (unable to 
inhibit a prepotent response) or did not perseverate (able to break the dominant response).  Of the 
inexperienced infants, one was a partial perseveration.  
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Latency in Experience Level between A and B
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Figure 6.  This is a comparison of latency (time to commit to a choice) between the average of 5 
A-trials and the average of B over levels of experience.  Inexperienced walkers were 
significantly slower to make a decision when it came to change sides.  More interestingly, 
inexperienced walkers took a longer time to decide on B trial while experienced walkers, on the 
other hand, showed a much faster time in committing to a choice. 
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Latency in Seconds per Trial by Experience Level
Trial
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Figure 7. The average latency (time to decide) was computed in seconds and then presented 
by experience level.  A trend is indicative that infants got faster deciding to go to A from the first 
to the fifth trial but it was only the inexperienced walkers who showed cognitive difficulty 
making the correct decision to B. 
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Avegage Descent Time in Seconds for A- and B-side by Experience Level
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Figure 8.  This graph represents the average time (in seconds) of trials A-1 through A-5 
compared to the average of the only B-trial across experience levels.  While inexperienced 
walkers were in general slower, there was not a significant difference.  Standard error is 
represented by the error bars.   
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Trends in Duration of Descent by Trial between Experience Levels 
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Figure 9.  The means in seconds were calculated for each trial.  Only the inexperience showed a 
learning trend (A1 to A5); in other words, got significantly quicker descending than their 
experience counterparts.  There was not significance with regards to the switch in time during 
trial B. 
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Descent Strategy Use by Experience Level
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Figure 10.  The percentage of strategy use is demonstrated here based on experience level. While 
both experience levels were more apt to execute an inefficient strategy, there was not a 
significant difference.   
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Table 1:  Number of Experimenter Contacts With or Without Need for the Inexperienced Level (Bold is 
perseveration) 
  Contact Frequency    Contact Percentage 
  Total   Necessary  Total   Total Necessary    
      Inexperienced 
01_IM  6   6   25.00%  100.00%  
02_IM  3   3   12.50%  100.00% 
03_IM  6   4   25.00%   66.67% 
04_IM  13   13   54.16%   100.00% 
05_IM  8   7   33.33%   87.50% 
06_IM  24   24   100.00%  100.00% 
07_IM  12   12   50.00%   100.00% 
08_IM  10   10   41.67%   100.00% 
09_IF  2   2   8.33%   100.00% 
10_IF  6   6   25.00%  100.00% 
11_IF  2   2   8.33%   100.00% 
12_IF  7   6   29.17%   85.71% 
13_IF  5   5   20.83%   100.00% 
14_IF  4   4   16.67%   100.00% 
15_IF  9   9   37.50%   100.00%  
16_IF  2   1   8.33%   50.00% 
Total:  119   114   30.99%   95.80% 
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Table 2:  Number of Experimenter Contacts With or Without Need for the Experienced Level (Bold is 
perseveration 
 
  Contact Frequency    Contact Percentage 
  Total   Necessary  Total   Total Necessary    
      Experienced 
17_EM  1   0   4.17%   0.00% 
18_EM  19   19   79.17%   100.00% 
19_EM  5   5   20.83%   100.00% 
20_EM  0   0   0.00%   0.00% 
21_EM  10   10   41.67%   100.00% 
22_EM  1   0   4.17%   0.00%  
23_EM  4   3   16.67%   75.00% 
24_EM  9   9   37.50%   100.00 
25_EF  13   12   54.16%   92.31% 
26_EF  14   14   58.33%   100.00% 
27_EF  0   0   0.00%   0.00% 
28_EF  3   2   12.50%   100.00% 
29_EF  1   0   4.17%   0.00% 
30_EF  5   5   20.83%   100.00% 
31_EF  14   14   58.33%   100.00% 
32_EF  20   20   83.33%   100.00%  
Total:  119   114   30.99%   95.80% 
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